Hybrid Regimes

Intro to Comparative Politics (Guest Lecture)

Georgiy Syunyaev

g.syunyaev@vanderbilt.edu

November 7, 2025

Democracy or autocracy?

  • Elections: President – every 5 years; Parliament – every 4 years

  • Legislature (Lower house): 460 seats; non-incumbent parties \(\approx\) 212/460

  • Executive term limit: Yes – max two 5-year terms

Raise your hand if you think this is democratic country? Autocracy?

Poland 🇵🇱: electoral democracy

  • Press freedom (2025): 31/180
  • V-Dem Liberal Democracy Index: 0.62 (rank 46)
Karol Nawrocki and Rafal Trzaskowski

Democracy or autocracy?

  • Elections: President – every 5 years; Parliament – every 4 years

  • Legislature (Unicameral): 199 seats; non-incumbent parties \(\approx\) 63/199

  • Executive term limit: No – Prime Minister is the head

Raise your hand if you think this is democratic country? Autocracy?

Hungary 🇭🇺: electoral autocracy

  • Press freedom (2025): 68/180
  • V-Dem Liberal Democracy Index (2024): 0.33 (rank 95)
Victor Orban

Democracy or autocracy?

  • Elections: President & Parliament every 5 years
  • Legislature (Lower house): 280 seats; non-incumbent parties \(\approx\) 104/280
  • Executive term limit: Yes – max two 5-year terms

Raise your hand if you think this is a democratic country? Autocracy?

Zimbabwe 🇿🇼: electoral autocracy

  • Press freedom (2025): 106/180
  • V-Dem Liberal Democracy Index (2024): 0.16 (rank 122)
Emmerson Mnangagwa

Democracy or autocracy?

  • Elections: President & Parliament every 5 years (general)
  • Legislature (Lower house): 99 seats; non-incumbent parties \(\approx\) 51/99 (2024)
  • Executive term limit: Yes – no consecutive terms

Raise your hand if you think this is a democratic country? Autocracy?

Uruguay 🇺🇾: liberal democracy

  • Press freedom (2025): 59/180
  • V-Dem Liberal Democracy Index (2024): 0.77 (rank 17)
Yamandú Orsi

Democracy or autocracy?

  • Elections: President – every 6 years; Parliament – every 5 years;
  • Legislature (Lower house): 450 seats; non-incumbent parties \(\approx\) 126/450
  • Executive term limit: Yes – two 6-year terms

Raise your hand if you think this is a democratic country? Autocracy?

Russia 🇷🇺: closed autocracy

  • Press freedom (2025): 171/180
  • V-Dem Liberal Democracy Index (2024): 0.06 (rank 159)
Election results

Plan


  • What are hybrid regimes?
  • Typology and global patterns
  • Competitive autocracies
  • Why mimic democracy / Effects
  • Power-sharing and stability
  • Spin dictators

What are hybrid regimes?


  • Sit between liberal (full) democracies and closed (full) autocracies
  • Elections and other checks and balances exist \(\Leftarrow\) minimal difinition of democracy
  • Civil liberties and freedom of expression are severely constrained
  • Include “grey zone” and competitive (electoral) autocracies (Levitsky & Way, 2010; V-Dem, 2025)

Typology (V-Dem, 2025)


Regimes over time (V-Dem, 2025)


Competitive autocracies (Levitsky & Way, 2010)


  • Formal democratic rules + systematic abuse of the state to skew competition
  • Opposition can campaign and sometimes win sub-national offices or seats in legislatures
  • National arena is tilted; incumbents rarely lose without shocks
  • Distinct from single-party hegemonies: real competition but unlevel playing field

Formal democratic rules in autocracies

(Meng, Paine & Powell, 2023)

How incumbents tilt the playing field?


  • Media capture: ownership concentration, self-censorship

  • Mobilize the state: public employment, social benefits, turnout machines

  • Rewrite (legal) rules: electoral rules, districting, media/NGO laws

  • Harassment: selective enforcement, tax probes, court cases

  • Vote environment: access barriers, voter intimidation & vote fraud

  • Fragment opposition: legal bars, selective prosecution, sharing of spoils

Media consolidation

https://www.hrw.org/report/2024/02/13/i-cant-do-my-job-journalist/systematic-undermining-media-freedom-hungary

Using state resources

https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkeys-raft-pre-election-spending-swell-budget-2022-12-30/?utm_source=chatgpt.com

Legalism

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-69007465

Vote fraud

https://meduza.io/en/feature/2021/09/20/flipping-moscow

Why autocrats mimic democracy? (Brancati, 2014)


  • Information: learn about opposition strength & public sentiment
  • Legitimation: signal competence and popular backing
  • Co-optation: distribute spoils, careers, policy influence
  • Stable power-sharing: commitment to sharing the spoils

Effects of mimicking democracy


  • Elections/legislatures can allow stable power-sharing

  • Control over playing field can lead to erosion of or low democratic norms

  • But it can also backfire – serve as focal points for opposition

  • Net effect can depend on

    1. control of information
    2. elite co-optation
    3. shocks and economic performance (!)

Democracy perceptions (Niradata, 2025)

Power-sharing is hard (Meng, Paine & Powell, 2023)




  • Many threats to rulers: coups, elite splits, mass uprisings

  • Commitment problem: promises to elites aren’t credible ex post

  • Power-sharing deals need

    1. Credible threat from opposition (elites or masses)
    2. Opposition willing to share power rather than overthrow ruler
    3. Ruler willing to forego part of their spoils

Hybrid regimes: transitory or stable?


  • Levitsky & Way (2010) argue that competitive autocracies are transitory and it depends on three factors

  1. Linkage to the West: density of ties

  2. Incumbent organizational power: ability to control elites and masses

  3. Western leverage: ability to punish abuses

Spin dictators (Guriev & Treisman, 2022)

  • Even closed (full) autocracies pretend to be hybrid or competitive

  • Prefer persuasion & manipulation over mass terror

  • Plausible deniability and democratic veneers (elections, courts, mass media)

  • Choose targeted repressions over mass repressions

  • Aim to maintain popularity, attract investment, avoid sanctions

Spin dictators are also unstable



  • Crisis triggers: war, large protests, elite defection, economic collapse

  • Toolkit shifts toward bans, arrests, force, comprehensive censorship

  • Some regimes hybridize: spin + selective intimidation

Takeaways


  • Hybrid regimes are common but could be unstable

  • Competitive autocracies: real competition, tilted rules

  • Autocrats adopt democratic institutions to co-opt, learn and legitimize

  • Stable power‑sharing is hard in autocracies and requires credible enforcement

  • Nowadays even closed autocracies try to mimic hybrid regimes and focus on manipulation

References


  • Brancati, Dawn. 2014. “Democratic Authoritarianism: Origins and Effects.” Annual Review of Political Science 17: 313–326.
  • Guriev, Sergei & Daniel Treisman. 2022. Spin Dictators: The Changing Face of Tyranny in the 21st Century. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
  • Levitsky, Steven & Lucan A. Way. 2010. Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Meng, Anne; Jack Paine & Robert Powell. 2023. “Authoritarian Power Sharing: Concepts, Mechanisms, and Strategies.” Annual Review of Political Science 26: 153–173.
  • V‑Dem Institute. 2025. Democracy Report 2025.